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Abstract: Future-bias is preferring some lesser future
good to a greater past good because it is in the future,
or preferring some greater past pain to some lesser fu-
ture pain because it is in the past. Most of us think that
this bias is rational. I argue that no agents have future-
biased preferences that are rationally evaluable—that is,
evaluable as rational or irrational. Given certain plausible
assumptions about rational evaluability, either we must
find a new conception of future-bias that avoids the dif-
ficulties I raise, or we must conclude that future-biased
preferences are not subject to rational evaluation.
Future-bias is typically thought to be rational, often obviously rational.1
Parfit (1984) offers this now familiar example.
I am in some hospital to have some kind of surgery. Since
this is completely safe, and always successful, I have no
fears about the effects. The surgery may be brief, or it
may instead take a long time. Because I have to cooperate
with the surgeon, I cannot have anesthetics. I have had this
surgery once before, and I can remember how painful it
is. Under a new policy, because the operation is so painful,
patients are now afterwards made to forget it. Some drug
removes their memories of the last few hours.
I have just woken up. I cannot remember going to sleep.
I ask my nurse if it has been decided when my operation is
to be, and how long it must take. She says that she knows
the facts about both me and another patient, but that she
cannot remember which facts apply to whom. She can tell
me only that the following is true. I may be the patient who
had his operation yesterday. In that case, my operation
was the longest ever performed, lasting ten hours. I may
instead be the patient who is to have a short operation
later today. It is either true that I did suffer for ten hours,
or true that I shall suffer for one hour.
1 Others have called this ‘bias against the past’ or ‘past discounting.’
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I ask the nurse to find out which is true. While she is
away, it is clear to me which I prefer to be true. If I learn
that the first is true, I shall be greatly relieved. (165–166)
It seems rational to prefer to be in the first situation in such cases despite
the fact that this preference involves preferring to be in a situation that has
a greater total amount of pain for you in the overall course of your life. In
fact, many philosophers take it to be obvious that this preference is rational
and without need of defense. Prior (1959), Craig (1999), Zimmerman
(2005), Heathwood (2008), Hare (2007, 2009), and Kauppinen (2018)
all claim that this bias is at least rationally permissible, if not rationally
required. However, a handful of philosophers—including Moller (2002),
Brink (2011), Sullivan and Greene (2015), Dougherty (2015)—raise dif-
ficulties for defending the rationality of this kind of bias. In this article I
present an argument that would mean that all these authors have got it
wrong. Future-biased preferences are not even rationally evaluable—that
is, evaluable as rational or irrational.
In determining whether an agent is future-biased, I will make use of the
definitions offered by Sullivan and Greene (2015).
An agent S is [future-biased] with respect to pleasure iff for
two exclusive experiences, E1 and E2, where E1 is at least
as pleasurable as E2, S prefers E2 because it is a present or
future pleasure rather than a past one. . . .
An agent S is [future-biased] with respect to pain iff for
two exclusive experiences, E1 and E2, where E2 is at most
as painful as E1, S prefers E1 because it is a past pain rather
than a present or future one. (949)
I will call agents “future-biased” if they are future-biased with respect
to pleasure, pain, or both. I will say that a preference is a future-biased
preference if it is a preference that meets the description on the right-hand
side of one those biconditionals. In this article I argue that we must reject a
plausible assumption about rational evaluability, find a new conception of
future-bias that avoids the difficulties I raise, or conclude that future-biased
preferences are not subject to rational evaluation.
The conclusion that there are no rationally evaluable future-biased pref-
erences is surprising and counterintuitive, but it has a substantial theoretical
advantage that makes this neglected view worthy of our attention. One
who is willing to accept the conclusion that future-biased preferences are
not rationally evaluable will be freed from the burden to explain the widely
assumed irrationality of another very common sort of time-bias—namely,
near-bias. How to discharge this burden has eluded philosophers since
Parfit first made the case for the tension between these biases in Reasons
and Persons (1984). Near-bias, roughly, is preferring less pleasurable ex-
periences because they are nearer in temporal proximity, or, conversely,
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preferring more painful experiences to less painful ones because those more
painful experiences are further in temporal proximity.
A popular putative example of near-bias is found in the well-known
Stanford marshmallow experiment. This study sought to measure the self-
control of children through an experiment in which some children were
told they could eat one marshmallow now or wait fifteen minutes and
receive two marshmallows. The kids who didn’t wait the fifteen minutes
to receive the two marshmallows are said to be near-biased—they prefer a
lesser good now to a greater good in the future.2 The claim that near-bias
is irrational seems to hardly warrant defense.3 But Parfit (1984) argues
convincingly that it is very difficult to defensibly claim both that near-bias is
irrational and that future-bias is rational. In brief, the argument is that the
way to argue that near-bias is irrational is to claim that a mere difference
in when something occurs does not affect its value. But if we make this
claim we should also think that future-bias is irrational. The fact that some
experience is past shouldn’t affect its value for us. Parfit considers possible
replies to this argument, but none of them seem to withstand scrutiny. For
example, you might think that future-bias is importantly different from
near-bias because we can’t change the past. If we can’t change the past, it
is reasonable for us to be less concerned about it.4 However, we still seem
to exhibit future-bias even if the future experience in question cannot be
changed. If it were certain that you were going to be tortured later this
afternoon, you would still be more concerned about this future painful
experience than you would be if it were already in the past. Parfit considers
and dismisses other possible defenses of an asymmetry in the rationality
of near-bias and future-bias. In my view, these arguments have yet to be
challenged successfully. Thus, it’s important to find a way to explain or
2 Mischel et al. 1972. It is worth noting that there is now doubt that the children in the study
were near-biased in the sense that interests us (i.e., there’s doubt that they had preferred the
temporally nearer marshmallow eating experience simply because it was temporally nearer).
Delaying gratification, waiting to receive two marshmallows had a lot to do with economic
and social disadvantages (Watts et al. 2018). It seems children who didn’t wait, often from
resource poor environments, doubted that there would be marshmallows in the future, or
at least assigned it lower probability. If a later outcome is lower probability than the nearer
outcome, it will often be rational to choose the nearer. This highlights one difficulty with
empirical investigation of near-bias and future-bias. It is difficult to create conditions that
would clearly demonstrate a preference for one experience over the other based simply on
the temporal location of those events (near or far, past or future) since it is difficult to create
conditions where the likelihood of those experiences is the same.
3 For philosophers and the casual observer at least. The irrationality of near-bias is more
controversial among economists and psychologists who are more likely to hold that only
structural constraints on preferences are relevant for whether preferences are rational.
4 This strategy for explaining how future-bias is rational while near-bias is irrational has
been pursued by Suhler and Callender (2012) and Dyke and Maclaurin (2002). Latham et al.
(2021) investigate empirically the reasons for future-biased preferences and find that the belief
that the past is practically irrelevant plays a role, but also find that even if agents supposed
that they could causally affect the past, they still exhibit future-bias.
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avoid the asymmetry of the rationality of these time-biases. If one accepts
my argument that future-biased preferences are not rationally evaluable,
there is no asymmetry to explain; this major obstacle for defending the
irrationality of near-bias falls to the wayside. In Section 6, I discuss this
theoretical advantage and the implications of my argument in connection
to near-bias in more depth.
The argument of this article shows that the position that there are no
rationally evaluable future-biased preferences can be motivated and is more
attractive than it initially appears. Even if the best response to my argument
is to reject one of the premises, we’ll learn that we must eschew plausible
claims about preferences and rational evaluability—a lesson that has gone
unappreciated.
1 Representation and Rational Criticism
Our definitions of future-bias say that being future-biased is a matter of
having certain preferences. So if we criticize the rationality of future-bias,
we criticize having certain preferences. Whether it makes sense to criticize
particular preferences is controversial. For some, one’s preferences are
rationally suspect only if they collectively violate some logical or struc-
tural constraints on preferences. These constraints rule against preferences
that would lead an agent to be Dutch-booked, for example.5 Views like
this tend to be accompanied by a behavior-based approach to preference
ascription, and they are typically espoused by those working in decision
theory and the theory of rational choice. On these views, preferences are
ascribed to an agent on the basis of behavior, choices a third-party observer
might describe them as having made. Below I put forward some claims
about rational evaluability and argue that those who think future-bias is
rationally evaluable are committed to them. By adding some cognitive
conditions for the rational evaluability of preferences, these claims align
with a non-behavior-based approach to preference ascription implicit in
some of our ways of speaking about preferences. These approaches need
not be exclusive, however. We can acknowledge that there are two senses in
which we have preferences. There is a behavioral sense that doesn’t come
with any built-in cognitive conditions on having preferences, and another
sense in which preferences are conscious mental states with certain repre-
sentational contents that are linked up with beliefs and desires in certain
ways. In the course of setting out my claims about the rational evaluability
of preferences and their implications for future-bias, it will become clear
that someone who thinks future-bias is rationally evaluable must think of
such future-biased preferences in the second sense. Prima facie, it will seem
5 An agent is Dutch-booked by having intransitive preferences. For example, they prefer A to
B , B to C , and C to A. If they are willing to pay a small amount to trade in A for C , and C
for B , and then B for A, they can be treated as a “money pump.”
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that the same must be true for near-bias as well, but as we will see later on,
near-bias need not be understood in terms of the second, or non-behavioral,
sense in which we have preferences. Let us now turn to rational evaluability.
Following this discussion, I’ll lay out the argument for the conclusion that
there are no rationally evaluable future-biased preferences.
My first claim is that if some preference is rationally evaluable, it should
in principle be possible to reflect on the alternatives that the preference
concerns (the objects of the preference) and then determine their relative
subjective value for us on that basis.6 The agent can then form a prefer-
ence for the alternative with greater subjective value. This does not need
to involve any kind of decision procedure, or any determination of the
subjective or objective probabilities of outcomes. We are just talking about
determining a preference, regardless of what is likely to occur or whether
any of our actions could bring about one or the other. I do not claim that
we reflect on, or that we ought to reflect on, the alternatives in every case,
or even in any case. I also do not claim that we must be able to assign
a precise subjective value to each alternative independent of one another.
Subjective value may be approximate and relative to an alternative. My
claim is simply the following.
Rational Evaluability Claim (REC): If a preference between some al-
ternatives is rationally evaluable, then we must be able, in principle,
to reflect on those alternatives and determine the relative subjective
value of the alternatives on the basis of that reflection.
I think this claim is highly plausible on its face, but let me expand on
what I take it to involve and make it more precise. What does it take to
have reflected on some alternatives, and determine their relative subjective
value on the basis of that reflection? At a minimum, we must be able to say
that the agent has mental states representing those alternatives, and that she
represents them in a way that would allow her to determine their relative
subjective value on the basis of that representation. In order to do that, I
think an agent must imagine, or cognitively model, the alternatives in a way
that captures the features potentially relevant to their subjective value for
the agent. Differently put, the representations must disclose features of the
alternatives that are the motivational basis for a preference between them.
For example, for Parfit to be able to reflect on which surgery alternative he
prefers to obtain in the case described above, he should imagine the relevant
details of both scenarios. This need not be pictorial imagining—it is enough
that the content of the representation includes, for the first alternative, that
he’s had a painful, ten-hour surgery. To represent his other alternative, the
content of the representation should include his having a painful, one-hour
6 By “subjective value” I mean roughly what others sometimes call ‘expected utility.’ I use the
expression ‘subjective value,’ however, because I find that ‘expected utility’ strongly connotes
a decision theoretic framework, and folks quickly forget that our focus is on determining
preferences between alternative experiences, not preferences between possible actions.
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surgery later. It’s hard to see how Parfit could assign a subjective value to
each alternative on the basis of his representations of them if he did not
have representations of the alternatives with at least those contents. Think
of this as a sort information condition for adequate representation of the
objects of a preference.
For another example, consider a case in which my boss asks me to
form a preference between watching a movie or scrubbing the floor. If I
formed my preference for the former by imaging going to the zoo versus
taking a nap, I clearly did not succeed in reflecting on the alternatives and
forming a preference for watching a movie over scrubbing the floor via
my representations. Now I’m not making any claims here about when or
whether you need to adequately represent the objects of a preference for
the preferences you form to be rationally evaluable. I’m just interested
in the modest claim that you should be able to adequately represent the
alternatives, the objects of the preference, in order for you to have a
rationally evaluable preference between them. In addition, I claim that the
adequate representation that you should be able to have requires having
representations of the objects of the preference for A over B that disclose
the motivational basis for a preference for A over B .
You might go further here and say that you should be able to adequately
represent the alternatives, the objects of the preference, in order for you to
have the preference at all, not just for it to be rationally evaluable. Imagine
that someone asks you to form a preference for either sitting on a round
square or standing on a round triangle. This is a case in which some would
say you’re not able to represent the objects of the preference. If that’s right,
you cannot imagine sitting or standing on impossible objects in a way that
would allow you to determine the subjective value of those experiences.
If you believe that you cannot represent impossible objects, then even if
you grant that in some sense you can form a preference between sitting
on a round square or standing on a round triangle and express it, it’s not
appropriate to say that the preference in and of itself is rational or irrational.
How could it be? Sure, you’ve selected one or the other in saying “I prefer
to sit on a round square,” but you haven’t even imagined the relevant
alternatives in your mind. Perhaps it’s rational or irrational to attempt to
form that preference. Perhaps a preference between some stand-ins you
might be imagining is rational or irrational. Maybe I’ve always loved the
look of triangles, and I’ve imagined standing on a triangular neon sign
with rounded points. But a preference between standing on neon signs of
shapes with rounded corners is not a preference between standing on a
round triangle or sitting on a round square. In light of this, you might insist
that without being able to represent the objects of the preference for A over
B , you really cannot be said to have a preference between A and B at all.
For the purposes of this discussion, I will only make the weaker claim that
you cannot be said to have a rationally evaluable preference for A over B
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in such a situation (again, assuming we cannot represent objects like round
squares adequately).7
I opt for this weaker claim so as to avoid a confusion about the fact
that there are the two senses of having a preference mentioned above: the
behavioral and non-behavioral. In the behavioral sense, I think we can
have a preference between sitting on a round square or standing on a round
triangle. We do this by sincerely uttering things like “I prefer sitting on
a round square or standing on a round triangle,” or circling the words
‘sitting on a round square’ on a (strange) written questionnaire about one’s
preferences. (Never mind that you might not be able to demonstrate such a
preference by actually sitting on round squares instead of standing on round
triangles.) We cannot, however, have a preference between sitting on a
round square and standing on a round triangle in the non-behavioral sense
of having a preference in which preferences are mental states with certain
representational contents that link up with beliefs and desires in certain
ways (again, assuming we cannot represent objects like round squares
adequately).
Being able to adequately represent the alternatives for a (non-behavioral)
preference between A and B also sometimes calls for representing them
in a particular way. When we are considering questions about prudential
rationality, we are interested in what an individual prefers for herself.
Preferring is a kind of pro-attitude, much like desiring. (Some even consider
preferring and desiring to be the same.) Beliefs and pro-attitudes such as
desires and preferences are often de se—that is, they are beliefs that about
me, how I am, or desires (preferences) about what I experience, what
happens to me. Arguably, when we limit ourselves to prudential rationality,
all such preferences will be de se. At the very least, it’s plausible that any
future-biased preference in the sense we’ve defined above will be de se,
since it’s a matter of the agent preferring some experience over another for
themselves.8
A couple of other sorts of distinctions go hand in hand with the de
se/de dicto distinction. The distinction between imagining “from the inside”
7 There is the question of whether imagining standing or sitting on rounded shapes could be
representing the objects of preference enough; we of course do not want to require that one
be able to represent the objects of the preference perfectly. Fortunately, we need not worry
about the difficulty of specifying what exactly is enough for my argument to come. As I will
explain further, all that matters is that the agent be able represent objects of the preference
enough to motivate preferring one or the other.
8 Some have written about what are sometimes called “other-regarding” or “third-person”
(apparently) future-biased preferences—cases in which we prefer someone else have one
experience over another because it is past (future) for them. Those preferences are moral
preferences, or at least preferences that are outside the scope of prudential rationality, but
even with these other-regarding preferences, it is plausible that we do or maybe ought to
imagine the alternatives by considering the other person’s point of view in a first-person way
“from the inside.” See Parfit 1984, 181, Brink 2011, 378–379, and Dougherty 2015, 3 for
discussion of these kinds of preferences.
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in a first-person way versus imagining “from the outside” is roughly the
distinction between imagining experiencing (or doing) something, versus
imagining that something is the case. This distinction lines up fairly neatly
with the de se/de dicto distinction, which can be described as sort of a first-
personal/third-personal distinction. Plausibly the representations involved
in potentially future-biased preferences are going to be de se contents and
involve first-personal representing of what the experiences are like “from
the inside.” Recall that future-bias as defined above is a matter of an agent
preferring A2 > A1 with respect to pleasure or pain because one of these
alternatives is past or future for them. The agent’s representations must
disclose how pleasurable or painful the experiences are for the agent if they
are to disclose the features of the alternatives relevant for determining the
relative subjective value of the alternatives of a preference with respect to
pleasure or pain. These considerations suggest that adequately representing
the objects of a preference with respect to pleasure or pain involves de
se representing them in a first-person way “from the inside.”9 These
considerations suggest the following.
Necessary Conditions on Representation (CR): Relative to a prefer-
ence A2 >A1 with respect to pleasure or pain, an agent x adequately
represents an alternative, A1, only if (1) x represents A1 so that all
of the facts relevant to forming a preference A2 >A1 are included in
the representation of A1, and (2) x represents the relevant features
of A1 “from the inside.”
10
We can now make my initial claim about preferences more precise.
Precise Rational Evaluability Claim (PREC): If a preference between
some alternatives is rationally evaluable, then we must be able to
represent those alternatives without violating CR, and determine
9 You might think that even when it comes to forming preferences with respect to pleasurable
and painful experience there are times when adequate representation of the alternatives does
not require that we be able to consider those alternatives in a first-person way, and that
future-biased preferences provide the perfect example: if an experience is in the past surely
what that experience is like first-personally is irrelevant. After all, you won’t be reliving
that experience; it is a past experience. However, I think when we compare possible past
experiences (setting aside how they might impact how things are now and who we are) this
thought is not compelling. Consider whether you prefer to have had a very painful illness or
broken leg during your childhood versus a childhood otherwise the same but absent those
experiences. I doubt anyone would prefer the former. Perhaps illness is character building in
certain ways, but when we are considering preference with respect to pleasure and pain (not
the non-hedonic, such as character), it’s clear that one of the alternatives is more preferable. If
that’s right, what experiences are like first-personally must be relevant, even when it comes to
preferences involving past experiences.
10 I’m assuming here that we can think of A1 in this condition as the “same” alternative
even if that alternative would be modeled by a different set of centered possible worlds
when evaluated by different agents, or simply by some possible world when referring to the
alternative third-personally. I’ll discuss the matter of centered-worlds later.
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the relative subjective value of the alternatives on the basis of these
representations.
The forgoing discussion shows that PREC is a plausible claim, but it’s
worth appreciating that those who think we have rationally evaluable
future-biased preferences have another reason to accept CR. Recall our
definition of future-bias. It tells us that an agent must prefer A2 to A1
because it is past (future). What is meant by ‘because’ in these definitions?
The natural reading of this definition, and what seems to be intended by
authors who have written on the subject of future-bias, is that an agent is
future-biased when the reason she prefers A2 to A1 is that it is past (future).
So it seems we should read ‘because’ in those definitions as concerning
reasons.
One important distinction made regarding reasons is the distinction
between normative and motivating reasons. While this distinction is usually
made in the context of reasons for action, we can easily extend the idea to
talk about reasons for preferring. Roughly, normative reasons would be
those that justify the preference, and motivating reasons would be those
that explain why the agent prefers what she does. Since our definition
of future-bias is neutral on whether an experience being past or future
is a reason to prefer it, we must be talking about motivating reasons as
opposed to normative reasons. Motivating reasons are typically thought
of as belief-desire complexes. If this is right, then preferring A2 to A1
because it is past (future) will involve having a belief (or set of beliefs)
that involves a representation of A2 and A1, and represents one of these
as future, and one as past. And while it is true that one could have a thin
(perhaps dispositional) notion of belief that requires little in the way of
representation in order to be attributed with the belief, if it is supposed
to contribute to the explanation of the agent’s preference between A2 and
A1, then there must be some explanatory relation between the alternatives
in question, and psychologically accessible content of the beliefs tied up
in the agent’s motivating reasons. This is because motivating reasons are
supposed to cause the agent to have that preference. The beliefs involved
in the agent’s motivating reasons could only be causally efficacious in this
way if they have representational content that is likely to be psychologically
causally efficacious in forming that preference. Of course, agents could have
beliefs that seem to have no reasonable connection in terms of content to
other mental phenomena that they in fact cause, even when combined with
desires or other mental states. However, in these cases the relationship is
better described as a merely causal relationship, as opposed to a motivating
relationship. If all of this is right, the agent must represent the alternatives
in a way that discloses the motivational basis of a preference between A2
and A1 in the spirit of CR in order to have a future-biased preference at all
given our definitions of future-bias. It also suggests that whenever we are
582 Callie K. Phillips
talking about future-biased preferences, we are talking about preferences
in the non-behavioral sense.
Of course, intuitions will vary on exactly what (and how much) infor-
mation is relevant to an agent’s choice between some alternatives. But
if my arguments above are right, philosophers who think that there are
future-biased preferences must accept that temporal features of experiences
need to be represented in the representations of the alternatives since being
future-biased is a matter of preferring some past (future) experience to a
future (past) experience because it is past (future). This is enough for my
argument below.
In Section 2, I will present a future-bias case study and show that an
agent cannot form the future biased preference A2 >A1 without violating
CR. If CR cannot be met for future-biased preferences, we’ll have all the
ingredients for the argument that there are no rationally evaluable future-
biased preferences. This argument can be distilled to the following:
P1. If you cannot possibly represent A1 adequately to the preference
A2 >A1, then A2 >A1 is not rationally evaluable.
P2. If you are representing the experience in A1 as present, then you
are not representing the experience in A1 as past.
P3. If A2 >A1 is future-biased with respect to pleasure, then necessarily
(if you are representing A1 adequately to the preference A2 > A1,
then you are representing the experience in A1 as past).
P4. If A2 >A1 is future-biased with respect to pleasure, then necessarily,
(if you are representing A1 adequately to the preference A2 > A1,
then you are representing the experience in A1 as present).
C1. If A2 >A1 is rationally evaluable, then A2 >A1 is not a future-biased
preference with respect to pleasure.
C2. If A2 >A1 is future-biased with respect to pleasure, then A2 >A1 is
not rationally evaluable.11
P1 is a boiled-down expression of PREC. I take P2 to be a conceptual truth
or very nearly one, in no need of defense but it will be addressed further
in Section 2 and Section 3. The discussion of CR above may already be
enough to convince you of P3 and P4. These premises focus on future-bias
with respect to pleasure but a parallel argument can be given for future-bias
with respect to pain. In essence, if A1 is a past experience and A2 > A1
is a future-biased preference then P3 says that if you satisfy CR, and so
represent A1 adequately, then you’ll represent the experience in question as
a past experience. This should be uncontroversial given that a future-biased
preference is one where a less pleasurable future experience is preferred
11 The necessity operator for premises and conclusions is omitted for simplicity. See the
Appendix for a proof of the validity of this argument.
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over a more pleasurable past experience (or a more painful past experience
is preferred to a less painful future experience).
Similarly, if A1 is a past experience and A2 >A1 is a future-biased prefer-
ence, then P4 says that if you satisfy CR, and so represent A1 adequately,
then you’ll represent the experience in question as a present experience.
Why think P4 is true? If A2 >A1 is a preference that is future-biased with
respect to pleasure (pain), then it is a preference motivated (in part) by the
fact that the past experience would have been pleasurable (painful) to some
extent for you. So to be motivated to form the future-biased preference
A2 > A1, you must represent A1 in a way that allows you to evaluate the
relative pleasurableness of the experience for you. Evaluating phenomenal
features of an experience such as their pleasure plausibly requires imagining
the experience occurring “from the inside” and thus as a present experience.
So imagining A1 adequately requires imagining the relevant experience as
present. P4 along with P3 will be explored further by looking at the case
study in Section 2. I’ll then address some possible objections to CR and
make some remarks about what my argument means for our understanding
of future-bias before closing with a discussion of what it might tell us about
near-bias.
2 Case Study
Vacation Case: A magician approaches you and offers you a choice.
He will either grant you a great and exceptionally enjoyable vacation
located in your past, or a lesser but still pleasant vacation located
in your future.12
Which do you prefer? Most of us would prefer the future vacation, and
for many this seems like a clearly rational preference.13 It is worth noting
that we need not think changing the past is possible in order to assess this
type of scenario. We can construct cases like Parfit’s surgery case (quoted
above) where amnesia rules out that complication, but no changes to the
past are involved (and no one needs to have magical power regarding the
future). It is already settled what past events have occurred and, in Parfit’s
surgery case, what events will in fact occur given the agent’s situation. Thus,
12 This is a variation of a scenario described in Sullivan and Greene 2015.
13 New empirical work on future-bias suggests that people are future-biased with respect to
both pain and pleasure (hedonic subjective value) when the future and past events are equal,
and also when the alternatives are ten negative experiences in the past versus one negative
experience in the future. When it comes to ten favorite meals in the past versus one favorite
meal in the future most subjects did not show future-bias by preferring the one future favorite
meal (Greene et al. Forthcoming). This seems to suggest that people are more future-biased
with respect to pain or negative experiences than pleasures or positive experiences. However,
I think it is important to reevaluate whether these kinds of studies in which subjects are asked
to report their preferences between options with a grain of salt in light of my arguments,
which show that representing the objects of these preferences adequately may not be possible.
I discuss this further in Section 5.
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the matter of the necessity of the past is not crucially involved in generating
the kinds of cases we want to consider.14
For now, let’s consider this case in which the agent remembers her actual
past, and knows she is located at a particular time, call it t3. A branching
time diagram will help us to keep in mind the various options as we discuss
the case:
t1 – history of 
agent up until 
this point is the 
same
t2 – no vacation 
here
t2′ – great 
vacation
t3 – agent is 
posed the 
question “would 
you prefer to 
have a greater 
vacation in the 
past or a lesser 
vacation in your 
future?”
t4 – lesser 
vacation
t4″ – no vacation
t4′ – no vacationt3′
< history 1 (H1)
< history 2 (H2)
< history 3 (H3)
How should the agent represent and compare the alternatives for the
purpose of assigning a subjective value to them? I will consider three
strategies which appear to exhaust the available options.
The first strategy involves comparing the “histories” diagrammed above
to one another—in other words, comparing the alternatives as sequences
of events without thinking of oneself as located at a particular time in the
sequences. With the second strategy, one does not abstract from one’s actual
temporal location (t3) but rather attempts to conceive of the alternatives
only from one’s actual temporal perspective. The third way is to compare
being located at t3 with being located at t3
′ by imagining having the one
temporal perspective and then imagining having the perspective correspond-
ing to the other time. Other apparent strategies will either reduce to these
or rely on some controversial view about the metaphysics of time. Let us
consider each of these strategies in turn. I’ll first informally say why they’re
insufficient for representing the alternatives in a way that meets CR. In
Section 3, I’ll return to why the agent will fail to meet CR on each strategy
given the formal objects we might use to model representational contents.
Our first strategy is for the agent to decide whether she would prefer a
greater vacation in the past to a lesser vacation in the future by comparing
history 1 (H1) to history 3 (H3) (refer to the diagram above) considered as
histories, or sequences of life events. This involves bracketing, or disregard-
ing, her actual temporal perspective (and any other temporal perspective)
in evaluating each alternative.
When we reason this way, the preferable alternative (for the normal
person who likes great vacations) is H3. Compared to H1, H3 affords the
14 We also don’t need to take a stance on the metaphysics of time, though relational (B-
theoretic, non-absolute) notions of past and future are used in my arguments. See footnote 19
for more discussion.
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greatest utility for the agent’s life as a whole. But once she abandons her
actual temporal perspective (the perspective of t3) and chooses one history
over the other, she seems to no longer be choosing between a great past
vacation on the one hand and a mediocre future vacation on the other. This
strategy leaves out the pastness and futureness of the events, a key aspect
of the alternatives, and the aspect that makes having a preference between
them a potential instance of future-biased preference. Since this strategy
leaves out relevant features of the alternatives, it violates CR.
The second strategy is to refrain from abstracting from our actual tem-
poral location at all. If the problem with the first strategy is that we were
too quick to abstract from our actual temporal location, then the second
strategy may look promising. Unfortunately, this won’t work if one of the
alternatives we need to represent involves having a different past. If the
agent chooses not to stray from her temporal location at t3 in her repre-
sentation of the alternatives, then she cannot represent t2
′ as past because
while located at t3, t2 is the past. This is just the obvious point that if we are
going to represent the past as being different from how it actually is, then
we can’t also, as a part of that same representation, represent it as being as
it actually is. This does not mean that we can’t think of t2
′ as a possible
past, but it won’t be in a sense that allows us to assess the subjective value
of the alternative on the basis of that representation. When we represent
alternatives with the aim of assessing how pleasurable or painful the ex-
periences will be for us, we will try to imagine them as actual. With the
diagram in view, the point is that if having a different past is possible, and
we are to represent what it would be like for it to be actually our past—we
will be imagining being located on another branch (so to speak) parallel
to the one on which we are located. (There is no sense in which one stays
located on the same branch while a segment of the branch is replaced. This
replacing of some portion of our past is simply represented by the change
to a different branch, since we take ourselves to be modeling time and
possible histories in a way that respects the fixity of the past, i.e., the view
that the past is settled and cannot be changed.)15 Thus this strategy fails
to help us meet the conditions of CR; we can’t represent the alternatives
without abstracting from our actual temporal location.
One last strategy is available. First, we assess the past vacation alter-
native from the temporal perspective of t3
′. Second, we assess the future
vacation alternative from the temporal perspective of t3, and then compare.
Prima facie, this seems to be the way an agent ought to be representing the
alternatives. It resolves the difficulty of the vacations losing their pastness
or futureness with respect to the agent (as with the first strategy), while
15 I am taking a position on how to represent changing the past, which I won’t defend in this
article beyond suggesting that if representing having a different past is not represented by the
change to a different branch but is instead represented by replacing a segment of the branch,
it is just a way of denying that we could represent having a different past at all. Changing the
diagram is not a way of representing something with a diagram.
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also allowing an agent to represent having a different past (as was missing
from the second strategy).
There’s a tempting mistake we must avoid. When the agent tries to
imagine each alternative from the corresponding temporal perspectives, she
might try to do this by just imagining experiencing t3 or t3
′ in each of these
worlds as present. If this is all she does to represent the alternatives, she is
just imagining beginning her experiences at t3 or t3
′ with the memories of the
past events of those times. The preference then threatens to transform into
a different preference than the one under consideration. It’s a preference
between a vacation lying in wait to actually be experienced and a mere
fuzzy memory. This won’t do. The alternatives offered by the magician
are between experiencing a great past vacation (A1) and experiencing a
mediocre future vacation (A2) —not a fuzzy memory of a great vacation
and a mediocre future vacation. You might well have a great vacation
in your past even if you can’t remember it later.16 Call this the memory
mistake. This violates condition (1) of CR.17
Being careful to avoid the memory mistake when representing the alter-
natives is essential if we hope to satisfy CR. But what will that take? The
agent must somehow represent having actually experienced the past vaca-
tion of the first alternative. On an ordinary conception of times and events,
when some event is past of you it was at some time future and present. This
suggests that in order to satisfy both conditions of CR and avoid the mem-
ory mistake she must imagine that she actually experienced that past event
by imagining it as present. When she does this, she has imagined not just
being at t3
′ presently, but also being at t2
′ and experiencing t2
′ as present.
But when she does this, it starts to seem like she has simply just imagined
the relevant sequence of life events, or the history H3. If this is the only way
to adequately represent the being located at t3 or t3
′, we fail to represent
the alternative in question because we have failed to do justice to the fact
that a representation of the alternative must involve having a particular
temporal perspective with certain events past (future) of the agent. This
is true for any pair of alternatives that would feature in a future-biased
preference according to our definitions. It’s not enough that we imagine
having experienced each of the relevant events in the sequence as present.
This does not yield a representation of the alternative where the event is
past (future), which is essential if the preference is to be a future-biased one
16 The situation is analogous to Parfit’s amnesia case quoted in the introduction.
17 On some views of prudential rationality, the rational thing to do is to satisfy your present
desires. If this sort of view is correct, one might respond that the memory mistake is no
mistake at all. One could argue that only present desires are relevant to assessing what
alternative it is rational to prefer. Thus, the only significance the past vacation experience has
for assessing the alternatives is its impact on my present desires as a memory. To respond in
this way is to lose sight of the target. If we hold this kind of view, it is true that it probably
won’t matter to the outcome of a deliberative process that the memory mistake is committed.
Nonetheless, one still has not successfully represented the alternatives in a way that satisfies
both conditions of CR.
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according to our definitions. The trouble is that adequately representing the
alternatives in accordance with CR demands imagining having experienced
the relevant past events as present, while also imagining that those events
are past and that some other time is the present. A coherent representation
cannot represent a particular experience as both past (future) and present.
If all of this is right, it’s not possible to represent the alternatives of the
Vacation Case in a way that satisfies CR. In Section 3, I’ll argue for my
conclusion more directly by helping myself to a possible worlds framework
for modeling de se representational content. In this setting it is most
transparent that this predicament is unavoidable. However, readers who
are satisfied with the more intuitively presented reasoning of this section
may skip it.
3 Alternatives and Centered Possible Worlds
The representation of the alternative of having a great past vacation (A1)
clearly must represent the agent as having a great past vacation if it is to
include the relevant facts and meet (1) of CR. Her representation should
also be de se. A helpful way to model de se contents, first introduced
by David Lewis (1979), is with centered-worlds.18 For our purposes, a
centered-world is an ordered pair of a world and a center, where the center
is an ordered pair of an individual and a time. (It may help to think of the
centered-world as the content of the representation.) In the centered-world
(or set of centered-worlds) for A1, the agent is at the time t3
′, and has the
property <being such that I experienced a great vacation in the past>. This
constitutes the basic representing of the “relevant facts” required by (1) of
CR.
How exactly does one represent having that property? When one actually
has a property like the property <being such that I experienced a great
vacation in the past>, it is usually accompanied by the belief that one has
this property. And normally having true beliefs about one’s past is due,
at least in part, to one’s remembering the past experience. But A1 cannot
be represented by the set of centered-worlds where the agent at a time
(t3
′) has a certain belief and memory of a great vacation. Representing A1
as a matter of having a certain memory gets the alternative wrong—it’s
perfectly consistent with A1, as specified by the magician, that at t3
′ in these
centered-worlds you have the property <being such that I experienced a
great vacation in the past>, though you don’t remember it. So to represent
A1 adequately I must imagine having this property without simply imagining
having a memory of this vacation. (This is the memory mistake discussed
18 I work with Lewis’s way of modeling de se contents here because it nicely illustrates the
difficulty of meeting CR. There are other ways to model de se contents. Some will still make
precise the difficulty for meeting the CR. Perhaps others will not. Nonetheless, the intuitive
problem sketched in Section 2 will remain for anyone sympathetic to PREC and the idea that
future-bias is rationally evaluable.
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earlier.) As a result, imagining having some memory of a great vacation
isn’t going to help us meet (1) of CR. We must try a different tack.
First, notice that properties attributing past experiences to someone
are relational properties. It is easy to imagine “from the inside” having
intrinsic properties such as being six feet tall or even (temporally) present
relational properties like standing next to the president. Properties that
involve relations to times other than the centered-on time of a centered
world cannot be represented first-personally in this way. This is because
centered-worlds “zero-in” on a particular time—a particular temporal
vantage point—at a possible world. And we noted that the representations
of alternatives must incorporate this perspectival component not only to
retain the relevant pastness or futureness of the events associated with each
alternative, but also to capture the fact that these are de se representations—
possibilities for you, if you are the agent being posed a question like the
one from our case study. There is, then, prima facie a puzzle about how we
are to represent being the bearer of these past-experience properties if one
of the relevant relata (in this case an experience) is not located at the time
specified by the set of centered-worlds under consideration.
With this in mind, another strategy for attempting to meet both (1) and
(2) of CR is to have the agent first represent experiencing the great vacation
as present, and then fast-forward, so to speak, to the time the centered-
world is centered on. But just stating this option immediately reveals the
problem with the suggestion. Imagining experiencing that great vacation as
present picks out a different centered-world from the one where the great
vacation is past; it is one where the agent is located at a different time. This
centered-world shares the same possible world as an element but represents
a distinct possibility because of the difference in times. (We might write
the first as 〈w1, t2〉 and the second as 〈w1, t3〉.) Another way to put it, to
echo our discussion with the first and third strategies discussed in Section 2,
is that the “being past” component of the property is lost if you merely
switch between these two representations, each representing some different
experience as present. This in turn keeps us from meeting (1) of CR, since
future-biased preferences always concern past (future) experiences.
One might be tempted to insist that past-experience properties need no
special treatment, and that there is no special way to represent them other
than attributing them to your counterfactual self. The agent does not need
to represent experiencing the past experience in order to fully represent
having the property of having some past experience: if I can represent
myself to myself, in the actual world, as having the properties that relate to
past experiences that I in fact have, there should be no special difficulty for
counterfactual representations.
If PREC is true, this response doesn’t work. Properties that attribute
past experiences or future experiences to an agent must be representable in
such a way that an agent may evaluate their subjective value. There can
be no evaluating the significance of the property’s contribution without
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representing the defining aspects of the property. The property in question
involves a relation, so the relata must be included in my representation if I
am to represent it.
There are two ways that we can understand the past-vacation-experience
relatum. We can either take “pastness” to be built into this relatum,
perhaps as an intrinsic property, or we can think that ‘past’ describes the
relation and the relatum is simply the vacation experience. Only the latter
understanding is consistent with the relational notions of past and future we
have been using in this discussion.19 The property <having experienced a
great vacation in the past> attributes to the agent a relation to a time (a time
when the great vacation occurs) that is past of her. It does not attribute any
temporal properties to the vacation or vacation experience itself. With this
in mind, we see that the great vacation is a distinct element of the property.
Since the property is to be self-attributed in a counterfactual de se content,
and experiences are properly represented first-personally and “from the
inside,” the agent will have to imagine the vacation experience as a present
experience in her representation of this alternative if she is to comply with
CR. But again, doing this means that the experience is not represented
as past in her representation of the alternative. We might put it this way:
the agent can merely succeed in imagining a centered-world where “the
center” is just an individual, but not where it is an individual and time pair.
But it is the fact that centered-worlds include an individual and time pair
that makes them suitable for representing contents that crucially involve
temporal perspective (as is needed for future-bias). We have now reached
the impasse seen in our first look at the case study—we seem unable to
represent the alternatives in accordance with CR.
So far we have only been discussing A1, the great past vacation alterna-
tive. A2, the mediocre future vacation alternative, involves a relation to
another time too. Ultimately, I think the same considerations apply there as
well, but I suspect that it is less intuitively compelling because our intuitions
about the openness of the future interfere.
Two conclusions are available given the preceding discussion. Either
(a), an agent may in some behavioral sense show a preference between the
alternatives, but since she does not meet CR and PREC is true, it cannot be
that she has a rationally evaluable future-biased preference; or (b) reject
19 More explicitly, we have been using B-theoretic eternalist notions. I have assumed that
an event is past (future) for an agent, x, if it is past (future) relative to x at some temporal
location. A-theorists and B-theorists alike can allow use of these relational notions of past for
x and future for x. A-theorists should allow these notions even if they think there are also
(perhaps more fundamental) A-properties. It is important to see that we need not take a stand
about the metaphysics of time in order to make use of the relational notions of past and future
I use in this article. If conclusive arguments in favor of some versions of the A-theory were
discovered, one may have the means to resist the arguments here. However, I think we should
remain skeptical about the prospects of discovering such arguments. Without successful,
independent arguments favoring A-theoretic views about the metaphysics of time, we should
not appeal to these views in assessing the rational evaluability of time-biased preferences.
590 Callie K. Phillips
CR (and therefore PREC). In the next section, I will consider some possible
reasons for rejecting CR.
4 Objections to the Necessary Conditions on Representation
There are various objections one may have to CR. To start, one might object
that there will be cases where we may want to leave out certain experiential
aspects when representing an alternative. For example, suppose I am a long-
time cigarette smoker but have recently quit. Not knowing that I have quit,
a friend offers me a cigarette. Two alternatives present themselves: smoking
the cigarette or not smoking the cigarette. When making my decision it
may be appropriate for me to choose not to imagine how pleasurable it will
be to experience smoking that cigarette. Instead, I will try to imagine how
the other alternative involves me continuing my commitment to refrain
from smoking, having fewer cravings in the future, etc.
These kinds of cases do not pose a problem for the account. Recall
that PREC requires only that we are able to represent the alternatives in
accordance with CR in order for a preference to be rationally evaluable,
not that we must always do so. Recall also that CR concerns preferences
with respect to pain or pleasure. When making a decision about how to act
it will often be appropriate (maybe rationally required) that we bring to
bear other considerations beyond what the experience will be like for us
qualitatively or perhaps even exclude them. The former smoker’s decision,
for example, may be one sensitive to non-hedonic values or downstream
effects.
Another worry is that taking these conditions seriously will require that
we play out every detail of the state of affairs represented by that alternative
in extreme detail in order to really represent all the relevant facts. If this
isn’t required, it is hard to see where to draw the line. We may have to
decide this on a case-by-case basis, or perhaps it will be in part settled by
some other rationality requirements. There is obviously no way to represent
every detail of some alternative that could be described as relevant.
One way to partially allay this worry is to bear in mind that these
alternatives will often be counterfactual states of affairs such that when
we specify a set of alternatives, the specification includes the salient way in
which the counterfactual state of affairs will be different from the actual
world. Given that the set of worlds or centered-worlds that are picked
out by that alternative are various, we need only represent the nearest
one—that is, the one that is most like the actual world, differing only in
respect to the specified features. So there will be a great deal that need
not be considered since it will overlap with the actual world, or would not
make a quantifiable difference to one’s assessment of the subjective value
of the alternative.
Although it is unlikely that there is any feasible way to eliminate the
imprecision involved, this should not be seen as grounds for dismissing the
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arguments of Section 3 and Section 4. As I argued in Section 1, the features
of the alternatives the arguments turn on are clearly relevant in virtue of
what it is to have a future-biased preference at all.
5 Exhibiting Future-Bias
If I am right about the Vacation Case, the same difficulties will arise for
any future-biased preference, and P3 and P4 of the argument presented
at the end of Section 1 are true. In Parfit’s surgery case, it is evident that
the same representational challenge arises. Even though the agent will
not remember experiencing the ten-hour surgery, she must nonetheless
represent the scenario as one where she in fact experiences ten hours of
pain in her past. The past experience of a painful surgery is a salient feature
of the alternative that must be included in order to represent that alternative
successfully.
But why, if my argument is correct, does it seem so obvious that we are
future-biased? I think there are a number of possible reasons. First, it’s
possible that we have implicitly (and mistakenly) thought that either first
or the third strategies sufficed for representing the alternatives. (It seems
unlikely to me that anyone ever thought the second strategy would work. I
discuss the second strategy just to cover the logical space.) We are not in
the habit of thinking very carefully about how we represent alternatives.
Second, as a possible sociological explanation, we should observe that
much philosophical discussion of preferences has occurred in the context of
decision theory and discussions of economics, where, as mentioned earlier,
preferences are assigned to agents on the basis of their behavior, including
verbal reports of having various preferences. There are several recent studies
on the extent to which people exhibit future-bias.20 They all proceed by
collecting responses to questions about what people prefer for themselves
among some alternatives. It might have been appropriate to say we have
future-biased preferences in the behavioral sense of having a preference,
if it weren’t for the sort of argument given above that this conception of
preferences is not compatible with the standard conception of future-bias
as preferring some experience to another because it is past (future). Future-
bias so understood calls for the non-behavioral sense of having a preference
on which having a preference requires cognitively representing the objects of
the preference. Agents reporting that they have some particular preference
doesn’t tell us whether they’ve represented the objects of the preference
in question adequately for a future-biased preference. The distinction
between these two ways of thinking about preferences seems to have gone
unappreciated. There is evidence that we use both the behavioral and the
20 See Caruso et al. 2008 as well as the recent studies by Greene et al. (2021), Greene et al.
(Forthcoming), and Latham et al. (2021).
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non-behavioral understandings of preferences in ordinary discourse. There
is not ordinarily any reason to tease them apart.
It’s worth emphasizing that the best response to the argument I’ve given
for the view that there are no rationally evaluable future-biased preferences
may well be to reject PREC or CR. One might reasonably judge that the
cost of rejecting the apparently obvious claim that we have rationally
evaluable future-biased preferences is too high, however initially plausible
PREC and CR may have seemed. But it’s worth keeping in mind that
denying that there are rationally evaluable future-biased preferences has
theoretical advantages like the one discussed in the introduction. We would
no longer have to reconcile the (apparent) rationality of future-bias with
the (apparent) irrationality of near-bias, a problem that has yet to find
an adequate solution. On this note, let us finally turn to how we should
understand near-bias if we accept my argument for the conclusion that
there are no rationally evaluable future-biased preferences.
6 Near-Bias
In Reasons and Persons, Parfit argues that all the ways of defending or
arguing against the rationality of future-bias also apply in a similar way to
near-bias. As a result, he thought there was no way to consistently hold
that future-bias is rational while maintaining that near-bias is irrational.
I have offered an argument for the conclusion that there cannot be any
rationally evaluable future-biased preferences, but will it also follow from
similar reasoning that there cannot be any near-biased preferences that are
rationally evaluable? The answer is probably yes if we define it much like
we’ve defined future-bias. A definition of near-bias along those lines would
be this.
An agent S is near-biased iff for two candidate future experiences,
E1 and E2, where E1 and E2 are equally probable and E2 confers
at least as much pleasure as E1, S prefers E1 because it is closer in
temporal proximity.
Whether it is possible to represent the alternatives in a way that satisfies
CR on this definition will depend on what is involved with representing an
experience as closer or farther in temporal proximity to another. But even
if an argument parallel to the argument against the rational evaluability of
future-biased preferences can be offered for near-biased preferences, it does
not mean we must conclude that we don’t procrastinate or make choices
that postpone the inevitable to our own detriment. It shows only that there
are no rationally evaluable near-biased preferences when near-bias is so
defined. Unlike future-bias, near-bias is amenable to being defined in terms
of our actions.
If we think that actions can exhibit near-bias in normal cases, and
that acting to bring about an experience does not entail that the agent
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adequately represents the alternatives (by the lights of CR) prior to acting,
the following account is available.
An agent S is near-biased iff for two alternatives open to S, E1 and
E2, where E2 is at least as pleasurable as E1, S acts to bring about
E1 because it is closer in temporal proximity.
This definition circumvents the problems with representation that I have
discussed in this article. (Of course, one may have other complaints about
it depending on one’s views about choice.) A definition parallel to this one
cannot be given for future-bias, because there will not always be two open
alternatives unless we reject the view that it is not possible to change the
past. Granting that it is not possible to change the past, we can accept
the argument against the rational evaluability of future-biased preferences
and maintain not only that we have near-biased preferences, but that these
preferences are irrational, as long as one holds a view whereby acting to
bring something about can be rational or irrational, and accept a definition
of near-bias akin to the one proposed here.
It’s worth appreciating that this would not be an ad hoc move. Unlike
future-biased preferences, it’s possible for near-biased preferences to be
action guiding, and they can be shown to violate structural constraints on
preferences. We can explain the irrationality of near-bias by pointing out
that a near-biased agent can be Dutch-booked— the near-biased agent will
act in ways that make them worse off. No arguments of this sort apply to
future-bias preferences.21
Moreover, understanding near-bias in terms of action comports better
with psychology and neuroscience research. The literature suggests that
near-biased choices are a function of interrelated neural systems. One is
a system that is responsible for representing the subjective value of future
events (Kable and Glimcher 2007). The second is responsible for the ability
to delay gratifications through cognitive control (Makwana et al. 2013).
The third is a system involved in episodic memory (Peters and Büchel 2010).
If these apparently near-biased choices result from weak self-control, or
limited ability to imagine or simulate future events, or beliefs about the
probabilities of events, then what behaviorally speaking looks like near-
biased preferences are not near-biased in the sense that philosophers often
have in mind, and which we have been discussing here: preferring a nearer
experience over a more distant experience, all other things equal, because it
is temporally nearer. However, subjects in these studies do seem near-biased
21 Dougherty (2011) argues that future-biased agents can be turned into “pain pumps” in
cases where agents are also risk averse in a certain way, and thus that future-biased preferences
are action guiding as well. However, I think there are reasons to be skeptical about the way
risk aversion is applied in these cases. Discussing objections to Dougherty’s argument would
take me too far afield here. Regardless, arguments like this show only that in when accepting
some other principles an agent will choose options that make them worse off. They are not
action guiding in the sense that important here: they always feature alternatives that are open
to the agent.
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in some behavioral sense that can be captured by defining near-bias in terms
of actions taken by the agent.22
More could be said about near-bias and its relation to future-bias, but
we can see that there are promising ways to make sense of the irrationality
of near-bias while endorsing PREC and CR. As I’ve noted, this is a desirable
outcome as it allows us to give a principled explanation for why near-bias
may be irrational while future-bias is not, something that should encourage
us to take seriously the case for the view that there are no rationally
evaluable future-biased preferences.
7 Appendix
Below is a proof of the validity of the argument at the end of Section 1.
1. Possibly, A2 > A1 is rationally evaluable AND future biased with
respect to pleasure. [@] (Assumption)
2. A2 >A1 is rationally evaluable AND future biased with respect to
pleasure. [w ′] (from 1)
3. A2 >A1 is rationally evaluable. [w
′] (from 2)
4. A2 >A1 is future biased with respect to pleasure. [w
′] (from 2)
5. Necessarily, if A2 >A1 is rationally evaluable, then possibly you are
representing E1 adequately to the preference A2 >A1. [@] (P4)
6. If A2 >A1 is rationally evaluable, then possibly you are representing
A1 adequately to the preference A2 >A1. [w
′] (from 5)
7. Possibly, you are representing A1 adequately to the preference
A2 >A1. [w
′] (from 3, 6)
8. You are representing A1 adequately to the preference A2 >A1. [w
′′]
(from 7)
9. Necessarily, (if A2 > A1 is future-biased with respect to pleasure,
then necessarily, (if you are representing A1 adequately to the pref-
erence A2 > A1, then you are representing A1 as present)). [@]
(P1)
10. If A2 >A1 is future-biased with respect to pleasure, then necessarily,
(if you are representing E1 adequately to the preference A2 > A1,
then you are representing A1 as present). [w
′] (from 9)
11. Necessarily, if you are representing A1 adequately to the preference
A2 >A1, then you are representing A1 as present. [w
′] (from 4, 10)
12. If you are representing E1 adequately to the preference A2 > A1,
then you are representing A1 as present. [w
′′] (from 11)
22 Thanks to an anonymous referee for this point.
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13. You are representing A1 as present. [w
′′] (from 8, 12)
14. Necessarily, (if A2 > A1 is future-biased with respect to pleasure,
then necessarily (if you are representing A1 adequately to the pref-
erence A2 >A1, then you are representing A1 as past)). [@] (P3)
15. If A2 >A1 is future-biased with respect to pleasure, then necessarily
(if you are representing A1 adequately to the preference A2 > A1,
then you are representing A1 as past). [w
′] (from 14)
16. Necessarily, if you are representing A1 adequately to the preference
A2 >A1, then you are representing A1 as past. [w
′] (from 4, 15)
17. If you are representing A1 adequately to the preference A2 > A1,
then you are representing A1 as past. [w
′′] (from 16)
18. You are representing A1 as past. [w
′′] (from 8, 17)
19. Necessarily, if you are representing A1 as present, then you are not
representing A1 as past. [@] (P2)
20. If you are representing A1 as present, then you are not representing
A1 as past. [w
′′] (from 19)
21. You are not representing A1 as past. [w
′′] (from 13, 20)
22. Contradiction. (lines 18, 21)
23. Not: Possibly, A2 > A1 is rationally evaluable AND future biased
with respect to pleasure. [@] (reductio)
24. Necessarily, it is not the case that A2 > A1 is rationally evaluable
AND future-biased with respect to pleasure.
25. Necessarily, if A2 >A1 is rationally evaluable, then A2 >A1 is not a
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